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I ARTICLES I
The Wages of Sin - Taking the Profit Out
of Corruption - A British Perspective
Dr. Barry A.K. Rider*
1. Introduction
Corruption is an "economic crime" par excellence! While there are
examples in history of those who have taken advantage of their position
to increase their power rather than wealth, in the vast majority of cases,
those who succumb to corruption do so in contemplation of financial
gain. Therefore, to seriously attack corruption, one of the most
important strategies must be to take away from those who have become
corrupted, the profits of their crime. In essence, corruption must be
made uneconomic. Thus, this article will look at the law and practices
of tracking and seizing such ill-gotten gains. This inevitably leads us
into a discussion of "money laundering."
Until the profits of crime are taken away from subversive and
criminal factions, there is little chance of effectively discouraging
criminal and abusive conduct that produces great wealth or, through its
profits, allows power and prestige to be acquired. As soon as the state
devises methods for the tracing and seizure of such funds, there is an
obvious and compelling incentive for the criminal to hide the source of
his ill-gotten gains - in other words, to engage in money laundering.
Like most social, let alone economic, evils, money laundering is
nothing new. It is as old as is the need to hide one's wealth from prying
*Dean, Tutor, Director of Studies and Fellow of Jesus College, University of Cambridge,
Lecturer in Financial Law, University of Cambridge. President of the British Institute of Securities
Laws and Executive Director of the Centre for International Documentation on Organised and
Economic Crime.
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eyes and jealous hands. Concern about the uses and misuses of hidden
money is not just an issue in our century. For example, in 1471,
Minister Yao Ku'ei complained that the practice of ensnaring young and
rising officials by providing "secret loans" that would ensure the lender
great influence in the future was a scandal and therefore, called for the
reporting of such advances.' Of course, the modern money launder will
no doubt adopt more sophisticated techniques than the gem carriers of
India or the Knights Templar,2 but his objectives and essential modus
operandi will be the same. The objectives will be to obscure the source.
Thus, the nature of the wealth in question and the modus operandi will
inevitably involve resort to transactions designed to confuse the onlooker
and confound the inquirer.
II. Hot Money: Reasons Why Money Laundering Occurs
There are a legion of reasons why an individual, not to mention an
organization, would wish to hide the source of money or to transmit it
in a manner that obscures its ownership or character.' While a great
deal of attention has been given to the vast profits that are being
generated by the illicit trade in narcotics, it is dangerous to assume that
the processes involved in money laundering cannot be and are not
deployed just as effectively to wash and to covertly transfer funds
produced by other types of crime, or even activities that would not be
generally considered criminal, but to which a certain amount of
opprobrium might attach." There are pressing needs for "secret money"
not only in the underworld of organized and syndicated crime, but also
in the service intelligence and security networks, which utilize the "secret
money" to facilitate if not "ordinary" commercial and banking
transactions, at least activities that are not necessarily abusive. In many
1. See Barry Rider, The Perception of Corruption in Developing Nations, Address at the
Third International Corruption Conference in Hong Kong (1987). By the same token, the debate
on confiscating drug dealers profits is not new. See generally THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWs,
February 1, 1930.
2. See generally J. ROBINSON, BORN IN BLOOD (1989).
3. For a general discussion of the need for secret money see I. WALTER, SECRET MONEY
(1989). See also V. TANZI, THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
(1990). For an interesting account of how social travel was funded during the 18th century, see J.
BOOKER, TRAVELLERS' MONEY (1994).
4. See B. RIDER, MEMORANDA (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987); B. RIDER, THE
PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION TO COMBAT COMMERCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRIME (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980); B. Rider, Combating International
Commercial Crime, 2 LMCLQ 217 (1985); MEMORANDUM FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA
TO THE COMMONWEALTH LAW MINISTERS' MEETING IN IIARARE (Commonwealth Law Ministers'
Meeting, 1986).
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situations, there are also needs for "unaccountable funds," and the
processes involved in washing money can and are efficiently employed
to create hidden reserves or secret money. These processes are then
utilized to service and transmit laundered money according to the
requirements of those who desire them.5
It must also be remembered that the purposes for which money is
required will also influence, if not dictate, the transactions that are used
to hide its true character and the way in which it is permitted to move.
For example, in developing nations, those involved in facilitating the
flow of capital that violates currency and fiscal controls may be able to
operate with impunity and no embarrassment in other jurisdictions,
especially those receiving the money in question. Therefore, there will
be little need to ensure that the money surfaces covertly and there will
be no requirement that the money should appear to have a legitimate
origin. Indeed, when the money is escaping from a country that is
seeking to expropriate wealth, whether pursuant to a program of so-
called indiginisation or otherwise, those involved in such financial
operations may even be held in high esteem by those whom they service
and those outside the country in question. On the other hand, where the
funds are the result of criminal activity, it will be necessary to ensure
that each element in the laundering process is covert and that when the
money finally emerges from the pipeline, it is ostensibly legitimate.
The purpose to which such funds are to be applied will also
influence the processes involved. If money is to be reinvested in other
criminal or subversive operations it will be important that the
transactions that establish it are not referable to other risk activity. The
money need not appear to those who receive it to be from a legitimate
source, however. In contrast, where the money is being used to
penetrate an institution or organization,6 then it will have to not only be
5. See generally ROWAN BOswORTH-DAVIES, EURO-FINANCE - THE INFLUENCE OF
ORGANISED CRIME (1980); BARRY RIDER, COMBATTING ORGANISED CRIME (Commonwealth
Secretariat, 1986); B. RIDER, ORGANISED CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING (1991). As more and
more information surfaces in regard to the "special services" provided by the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), it becomes increasingly obvious that the demand for laundered
funds is as pressing today as it ever has been. See J. ADAMS AND D. FRANTZ, A FULL SERVICE
BANK, How BCCI STOLE BILLIONS AROUND THE WORLD (1992); N. KOCHAN AND B.
WHITTINGTON, THE FINANCIAL SCANDAL OF THE CENTURY - THE BCCI FRAUD (1991); J. Beaty
& S. Gwynne, The Dirtiest Bank of All, TIME, July 29, 1991.
6. See generally The First National Bank of Boston Report of Hearing: Hearing Before the
U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); ORGANIZED
CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING (U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1984); Barry
Rider, Recycling Dirty Money, Address at the White House Conference for a Drug Free America
(1988) (on file with author).
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unconnected to the activity that generated it, but also be apparently
acceptable to those in control of the relevant body. It should be obvious
that the somewhat simplistic notions of money laundering that have been
preferred in a number of recent reports and publications presuppose a
clarity and simplicity of purpose that rarely exists.
Today, it is not uncommon to find indictments of those thought to
be involved in money laundering by politicians, law enforcement
officers, and the press. The term money launderer is pejorative and the
practice of money laundering conjures up a shady world of men in wide-
striped suits claiming to be "bankers" and acting for ill-defined
customers and vague offshore enterprises.7 The fact that many of the
cases that have come to light involve exactly such scenarios has tended
to reinforce such perceptions.'
For those engaged in fighting serious crime, it is perhaps a useful
device to persuade those-whose job it is to handle other people's wealth
that those who are prepared to assist criminals and terrorists to retain
their ill-gotten gains and further their illicit enterprises are no better than
the crooks they serve. Of course, when the money is the product of
drug trafficking or even a bank robbery, then the opprobrium that can
attach to those who assist in the laundering process is justly deserved.
However, it is very important to remember that those most actively
involved in providing such services may never transgress the law, and
in many cases, the laundering may well involve funds that are not
referable to a crime or other form of misconduct. The press has been
wont to ignore this when criticizing the apparent failure of regulatory
authorities to take effective steps to interdict what are assumed to be
money laundering operations. Indeed, it is often forgotten that the
relevant authorities, even if they had such information in a reliable form,
would have been hard-pressed to have curtailed such operations through
legal and coercive processes. Laundering the proceeds of drug
trafficking is one thing, but merely assisting a leader of a developing
country to retain his wealth on a confidential basis outside his country
may be a very different issue.9 To say that even the knowing facilitation
7. See generally J. CARR, HOW TO RECOGNISE A MONEY LAUNDERER (1989); D. FRANCIS,
ENTREPRENEURS (1988); R. FRANKLIN, PROFITS OF DECEIT (1990); R. NAYLOR, BANKERS.
BAGMAN, AND BANDITS (1989).
8. ROWAN BOSWORTH-DAVIES, MONEY LAUNDERING - THE USE OF THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES MARKET TO DISGUISE THE PROCEEDS OF FUNNY MONEY (1992); R. LACEY. LITTLE
MAN - MEYER LANKSY AND THE GANGSTER LIFE (1991); D. Henry, America's HottestExport -
Funny Money Stocks, FORBES, Sept. 23, 1985, at 38. See also J. ROBINSON, THE LAUNDRYMEN
(1994).
9. L. WELT, BLOCKED FUNDS (1990). Euromoney is a first rate account of how to "unblock"
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of such an individual's acquisition of wealth by covert movements of
substantial amounts of wealth - where no specific crime is involved -
is an unsound banking practice is a statement that few central bankers,
let alone others, would be prepared to support. Responsible banking is
a vague concept, even in a wholly domestic environment. In an
international context, it is nebulous and is an entirely different issue than
that of soundness.
III. Washing Money for a Price: The Legal Difficulties Posed by
Money Laundering
Some countries have courted money and wealth on the basis that
their legal systems will overthrow its owners. As such, their financial
transactions weave a cloak of secrecy thicker and more impenetrable than
the traditional rules relating to professional confidentiality. In some
instances, an assurance of absolute secrecy has been marketed as a
privilege that can be bought for either a relatively small registration fee
or for the cost of establishing an account.1 The original justifications
for laws that extended the more traditional privilege between a banker
and his customer, were no doubt acceptable. It is hard to find fault with
any attempt to protect those who are being slaughtered by an oppressive
and evil regime. However, other countries have not been slow to
perceive the benefits of becoming a depository for not only fugitive and
flight capital, but also dirty money. Countries in and around Africa,
Latin America, South East Asia, and the Pacific have been prepared to
extend the privilege of secrecy not only to their oppressed, but also to
their very rich neighbors. It is easy to criticize the naivety of such
countries, but prostitution says more about the state of society and its
values than the individual morality of the prostitute. There are countries
that have become so isolated from conventional sources of development
finance that their leaders, even assuming them to be men of honor, have
but little alternative to seeking funds from those who require discretion.
The laundering of money through national treasuries and
government-sponsored projects is nothing new. At perhaps a slightly less
egregious level, the same pragmatic arguments can be made in support
funds. There are other publications specifically marketed as providing expert advice on how to
launder and hide money.
10. Some countries have been prepared to allow others to market their willingness to facilitate
"secret" transactions to an extent which has raised issues of national integrity. See "Banks" Listed
in Grenada Cause Alarm, TIME, Aug. 6, 1991. See also A. SHIPMAN AND BARRY RIDER.
ORGANISED CRIME INTERNATIONAL, SECURITY AND DEFENSE REFERENCE BOOK (Cornhill, 1987);
G. DeGeorge, Psst, Wanna Buy a Bank? How About a Few Dozen? Bus. WEEK, Sept. 23, 1991.
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of raising revenue and expanding the economy by offering the legal and
other inducements to attract uncensored offshore business. Of course,
some countries that have attracted more than their fair share of criticism
and have got relatively fat on servicing secret accounts and the like, have
in recent years shown signs of contrition. A cynic might well observe
that the catalyst in the conversion, if not the reason, was the extent to
which the bankers were themselves being exposed to frauds both as the
victim and increasingly, in foreign jurisdictions, as the more or less
innocent abettor.'1
This is not the place to enter upon a discussion of the economics,
let alone the morality, of secret money in all its manifestations. Such
may, with confidence be left to the economists and theologians. This
article attempts to discuss only dirty money where the issues, while far
from settled, are relatively clear. Dirty money is money, or some other
form of wealth, that is derived from a crime or other wrong. Of course,
even such a simple and unlawyerly definition opens a Pandora's box.
First, even if one can determine a reasonably clear definition of money,
it is not difficult to perceive the ramifications of a concept of wealth that
is broad and ingenious enough to encompass the various products and
derivations that may in a certain place at a particular time have a peculiar
value of their own, or at least signify such a value to specific individuals.
For example, there have been cases where inside information was used
as a valuable commodity to purchase cocaine. Those who have
encountered the various underground banking systems, which will be
referred to later, will be aware that tokens, ranging from colored sugar
lumps to mere pass words, will be used to facilitate the transfer of
money. Such tokens, within the processes of the particular "banking"
systems, will often represent great wealth.
Perhaps from a lawyer's, not to mention a policemen's standpoint,
an even more vexing issue is when an item of wealth is the product of
an act or series of acts, or even, in the case of some generous legal
systems, a continuing enterprise. To some degree the issue is not just
one of tracing, but rather referencing. The wealth in question may not
necessarily be produced by the relevant conduct or crime. It may be
sufficient that it is associated with such conduct to acquire a sufficient
degree of taint. The legal process will generally require a much higher
standard of relationship than might be acceptable at the level of, for
example, an intelligence operation. Even if one passes over this very
11. See S. Froomkin, Money Laundering - An International Perspective, Address at the
Meeting of Law Officers of Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988).
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difficult matter of relationship and causation, one must enter into an even
more controversial area: Determining what sort of conduct will be
sufficient to justify describing the money as "dirty."
It is not always acceptable to simply have regard to the criminal law
of the country in which the funds originated. If the matter is a wholly
domestic one, then no doubt the local law and system of values will
satisfactorily determine the issue. However, most cases will involve two
or more jurisdictions. It might well be that although the conduct giving
rise to the funds is regarded as a criminal offense in the country
concerned, the same conduct would not be regarded as even improper
elsewhere, and certainly not in the country where the money comes to
rest. It is hardly necessary to descend into examples, as a moment's
thought will throw up scenarios involving religious and racial activities,
which, while amounting to criminal offenses in a particular state, would
not be considered improper in another.
The importance of this issue should be obvious when one considers
the vast amounts of money that were made by the Cosa Nostra during
the Prohibition in the United States. If such laws existed today in the
United States, and such funds were transferred to foreign banks, would
this amount to laundering dirty money? Perhaps viewed from the
perspective of the U.S. legal system the answer would be yes, but a
different view would surely be taken in most other countries. Even
when the wealth in question is the proceeds of what might be considered
an ordinary criminal offense, is it appropriate to designate it as dirty in
all cases, and if so, for how long and to what state of derivation? No
matter what the economists let alone the moralists might argue, common
sense indicates there must come a point in time when the taint that
attaches to the money loses its relevance.
Even when those responsible for the crime that created the profits
or those who are charged with laundering it are unsuccessful in giving
it an aura of legitimacy, there must come a time when longevity or
complexity of its history accords defacto legitimacy. Indeed, given the
vast sums of money that are passing through the laundering pipeline, it
is perhaps good for society that most criminals, and certainly those with
greater sophistication, evidently yearn to become, or at least appear to
be legitimate and thus, support our own value system and financial
structures. While wealth can to some extent assure respectability, there
is an obvious incentive for those desiring such status to bring "dirty
money" back into the conventional and lawful economy. Therefore, it
can be argued that procedures and laws that serve to inhibit the
repatriation of dirty money to the lawful economy perpetuate the taint
that attaches to the proceeds, and as such, are disadvantageous. These
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are pragmatic arguments, but it would be misconceived to assume that
such views have always been rejected by governments, particularly those
with significant underground economies and financial difficulties of their
own. 12
The simplest definition for dirty money is broad enough to
encompass money that is in some way referable to a civil wrong. It is
true that the proceeds of every imaginable civil wrong could not be
considered to be "dirty." Such money may be "hot", but it will not be
considered dirty. There are, however, situations where the proceeds of
a civil wrong can and should be regarded as dirty. While it is difficult
to be specific, it is appropriate to regard funds that are the proceeds of
a civil wrong involving a degree of dishonesty as worthy of attracting the
designation "dirty." It is not in every such case that the conduct would
amount to a criminal offense. However, where the funds have been
created by conduct lacking probity, it would not seem unjustified to
regard them as dirty. Although perhaps little other than institutional and
individual attitudes are influenced by such designations, there are
practical considerations in not distinguishing too sharply between the
proceeds of a specific crime and something that may only give rise to a
claim in the civil courts. 3
IV. Modus Operandi: The Money Laundering Process
Until now, this article has attempted to demonstrate what money
laundering involves. 4 Money laundering, secret money, and dirty
money have been discussed without an attempt to establish the interface
between the process and the product. However, definitions of money
laundering range from authoritative language of statutes to the punchy
comments of judges. 5 For the purposes of this article, and at the risk
12. See Drug Money Fears Halt of State Bond Sale, TIME, Mar. 23, 1992. The State Bank of
Pakistan had advertised the sale of bonds on the basis of "no questions about the source of funds"
and "no identity to be disclosed." Id.
13. See, e.g., Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Maritime Fraud (1985) (concerning
definition of fraud); BARRY RIDER, FRAUD IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS (Singapore Academy of Law Press, 1991).
14. For an excellent discussion of the topic, see S. ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECTION
(1989); THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANISED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY
LAUNDERING (U.S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, 1984); D. Chaikin, Money
Laundering: An Investigatory Perspective, 2 CRIM. L. F. 467 (1991); J. Koers, Current Methods
and Techniques of Money Laundering. Address at the Fifth Int'l Anti-Corruption Conference in
Amsterdam (1992) (on file with author).
15. A "prince" among money launderers, Michele Sindona, observed: "Laundering money is
to switch black money or dirty money . . . into clean money." L. DIFONZO, ST. PETER'S
BANKER - MICHELE SINDONA (1983).
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of adding yet another to the lists, money laundering is a process that
obscures the origin of money and its source. Of course, this is a wide
approach that would encompass transactions designed to hide money as
well as to wash dirty money into clean. It is the processes of transfer
and misrepresentation that constitutes the modus operandi of washing and
secreting money. Unfortunately, because of the attention money
laundering has been given in connection with the fight against drug
cartels, the topic of money laundering has become linked, if not
captured, by the debate on tracing and confiscature of the profits from
the illicit narcotics trade. Consequently, most discussions of money
laundering focus almost exclusively on this, and ignore the wider issues.
This article deliberately attempts to avoid placing emphasis on the drug-
related aspects of the subject. Yet, from the standpoint of statutory law
and in particular systems for international cooperation, 6 it is in the area
of narcotics trafficking that most, if not all, significant steps to combat
money laundering have been taken.
Discussion of the processes involved in money laundering has been
limited outside the United States. Few have recognized that even the
now traditional process of laundering involves a series of actions and not
a seamless process. While establishing the derivation of property
pursuant to a tracing claim is nothing exceptional, such cases rarely
involve the structuring of transactions solely for the purpose of avoiding
investigation. Obviously, there are cases in which considerable care has
been taken to frustrate inquiry, particularly where the funds in question
have been created or diverted by a systematic fraud. However, until
recently, in Britain at least, the need to examine deliberate and
sophisticated attempts to obscure ownership and control were rarely
encountered. Thus, there still tends to be a somewhat simplistic notion
of the laundering process, even in the case of narcotics trafficking. To
the contrary, however, laundering involves a series of stages and
different legal and enforcement considerations are naturally applicable to
each.
Many forms of crime and misappropriation produces quantities of
cash in relatively low denominations. This will need to be consolidated
16. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 1991); Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement
of Money Movement and Related Matters - A United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 465 (1989). It is a matter of regret that the Commonwealth initiative to combat money
laundering has been narrowed for political reasons to the war against drugs, when many developing
countries have other priorities, such as the control of corruption and economic crime. See generally
Y.B. Dato Seri Anwa Imrahim, Malaysian Minister of Finance, Commercial Crime, Opening
Address at CIDOEC in Kuala Lumpur (1992).
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into a form of wealth that can be more easily smuggled out of the
jurisdiction. The methods of achieving this are limited only by the
ingenuity of the launderer. Of course, high turnover and relatively low
investment enterprises that can be used to facilitate such a process will
be especially attractive, particularly if they are outside the conventional
banking system.' 7 Those involved in consolidating cash at this stage of
the laundering cycle will be most concerned with how to avoid the
creation of any external record that could be used to initiate an audit or
paper trail leading to subsequent stages or layers of the operation.
Once the money has been converted into a form that can be
transferred or smuggled, it will often be moved offshore. Taking the
money out of the country has a number of practical advantages. First,
it will often place the funds beyond the legal reach of the authorities in
the jurisdiction where the activity giving rise to the profits occurred.
Even if the relevant laws are capable of application on an extraterritorial
basis, and very few are, by involving another jurisdiction, significant
practical barriers are placed in the path of investigators in obtaining and
securing evidence that would be admissible before a court. As already
mentioned, certain jurisdictions are willing to offer banking and other
facilities on the basis that secrecy will be assured. Sadly, there are
countries that have been prepared to facilitate the receipt of money no
matter what its source. Once the money has been taken offshore it can
then enter either directly, or more likely indirectly, into the conventional
banking system. Obviously, the more discreet this process, the better for
the launderer. Hence, there is an attraction to jurisdictions that offer
either secrecy or a level of corruption that is sufficient to ensure effective
non-cooperation with foreign inquires."8
Once the money has entered the conventional banking system, it can
move through usual channels. The launderer's objective will be to create
a complex web of transactions, often involving a multitude of parties,
with various legal statutes in as many different jurisdictions as possible,
through which the money will be washed on a wave of spurious or
misleading transactions. The purpose of this action is to confuse even
the most dedicated and well-resourced investigator and to defeat any
attempt to reconstruct a money trail. Given the ease with which
17. Use of Casinos to Launder Proceeds of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: Report of
Hearings by U.S. House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Crime, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TYPOLOGY OF MONEY LAUNDERING, NON-TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (Financial Action Task Force II, 1991); L. Richardson, The Urgency of Detergency
(Or how Money Laundering is Carried Out), 1987 TVI J. 12 (1986) (H.K.).
18. For a critical, although somewhat dated survey of "responsiveness", see R. BLUM,
OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES (1984).
TAKING THE PROFIT OUT OF CORRUPTION
companies and other, legal entities may be created in virtually any
country in the world, the launderer's only constraints are likely to be
time or finances. The laundering of money is costly, and thus, both he
and his principals will only wish to expend what is necessary and prudent
to ensure the relevant funds remain beyond the reach of law enforcement
agencies or others interested in locating them. 9
Obviously, the amount of effort and expense that will be required
for laundering would be more than that required for frustrating a
regulatory authority to investigate a case of insider dealing. It must also
be remembered that while the money is in the pipeline, it is unlikely to
be usable. Consequently, most launderers are not only mindful of the
costs involved in the actual process, but of the length of time that will be
involved in washing the money. Obviously, there are situations where
the needs of the launderer are such that money can remain in the
laundering process for only relatively short periods. Thus, the
circumstances will to some extent influence the extent of the laundering
process and its sophistication. Laundering operations will range from the
most simple manipulation of accounts to structures involving hundreds
of companies with thousands of bank accounts. However, it must always
be remembered that the larger the organization that is employed to
launder the money, the greater the costs and the higher the risk of
detection or of something going awry.
The transactions that are used to obscure the source of the relevant
funds will be structured in such a manner as to render it almost
impossible for evidence to be obtained that would allow a court to
establish the derivation of the money. Law enforcement agencies often
refer to this process as layering, but this implies that the true facts may
be uncovered through a diligent and progressive investigation. While
there have been cases where dedicated, extremely lucky, and well-
resourced investigators have been able to peel-off a series of layers to
reveal what in fact took place, in the case of the more sophisticated
structures, the concept of layering is too simplistic. Certain operations
are structured in a manner that resemble a mosaic or kaleidoscope rather
than a layer cake. Transactions will not be progressive but parallel,
establishing mutual obligations that can be crossed, often on a contingent
basis, and which would not be substantiated to the satisfaction of a court
applying conventional legal rules. It is true, however, that insofar as the
notion of layering is often used to conjure up a picture of a stone
19. See generally MONEY LAUNDERING - GUIDANCE NOTES FOR BANKS AND BUILDING
SOCIETIES (Bank of England, 1994); MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE (DEA
& RCMP, 1989).
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gradually dropping to the bottom of a pond, the longer money remains
in the system the more difficult it is to follow and identify.
Furthermore, such an analogy makes the important point that the money
in flight will be most noticeable when it first "splashes" into the pool.
It is at this point of entry into the conventional banking system that
regulations designed to create an "audit trail" are likely to be most
effective .20
Once the money has been "washed" to the satisfaction of the
launderer, it will be necessary to place it in an "end deposit." Of
course, the nature of this "end deposit" will depend upon a variety of
factors. However, in most cases it will be desirable to return the money
to the jurisdiction in which it was first generated. Those responsible for
making such profits will often wish to enjoy at least part of the fruits of
their endeavor. Therefore, the launderer may well be required to ensure
that at least a proportion of the money is repatriated back to the country
of origin. Thus, it will be necessary for the launderer to create a
transaction, or more likely a series of transactions that will bring the
"clean" money back home. This can be achieved in a number of ways,
but it will be desirable to achieve the repatriation in a manner that can
be explained and which will justify the surfacing of the wealth in the
hands, or under the control, of the relevant principal.
A technique that has been employed to some effect is the
incorporation of what are essentially shell companies which can then
"sell" their securities to "overseas investors." The "overseas investors"
will be the money launderers' puppets. The purchase of such securities,
which will be properly documented, will provide a vehicle through which
the cleansed money can flow back into the control of those who
established the issue. It is important to recognize the use that such
companies may be put to in the context of money laundering operations.
There have been cases where the existence of operations such as this
have been mistaken for high pressure selling frauds or "boiler room"
scams. Although the modus operandi may be somewhat similar,
especially at the early stages, the purpose and implications of the
operation are very different.
20. Many jurisdictions impose reporting obligations in regard to transfers of cash or valuable
securities above a certain value. See generally U.S. Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988); U.S. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
§6501 (1988); The Cash Transactions Reports Act, 1988 (Austl.). At the international level,
attention is being given to recordkeeping and monitoring of cash transactions by non-financial
institutions pursuant to Recommendation 11 of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering.
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It must be appreciated that money laundering involves a series of
stages and each stage will have its own characteristics. Those charged
with the detection and investigation of such matters need to be alerted to
the implications of a process that will have been carefully designed and
structured with the objective of minimizing exposure and, thus, the risk
of interference. Sadly, legislators have often failed to appreciate the
complexity of money laundering both in terms of its character and
objectives. They have taken for granted a somewhat stylized model that
rarely conforms to reality. Indeed, given the nature and expertise, not
to mention resources, of those involved in this industry, there is every
incentive for their services to be adapted to take full account of any new
threat - including legislation. Their culture is one of evasion and
adaption.
V. Underground Banking: Facilitating the Money Laundering
Process
Although the authorities in the United States recognized the reality
of organized crime rather late, it is true that the United States has had far
more experience in attempting to deal with such problems as racketeering
and money laundering than anyone else. While it is also true that in
some respect this experience has not always been impressive in terms of
the results that it has achieved, it is not surprising that other countries
have turned to the United States for advice. While this is wise, some
countries have followed U.S. precedents in a rather unthinking fashion,
forgetting the deficiencies of the U.S. legislation and in particular the
very special situations that it was designed to confront. The U.S. law
has been more or less expertly crafted to address specific crime problems
that exist or did exist in the United States. The laws therefore reflect the
social, political, and constitutional circumstances of the United States.
As such, U.S. laws and their derivative enforcement policies are not
always obviously applicable to different societies. 2 Nonetheless, many
countries have simply ignored this and enacted laws modeled on only a
partial perception of the reality in the United States. The
inappropriateness of essentially Western laws that presuppose Western
structures and financial systems is clearly shown in regard to
underground banking systems.
21. For example, laws that contemplate the structure and operations of the Cosa Nostra may
have little practical relevance to the triads or yakuza organizations in the Far East. See
Japan-Dope Dealers'Delight, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Mar. 15, 1990, at 12.
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Underground banking systems have existed and developed to a level
in some societies where they rival in terms of efficiency and capability
the conventional banking system. 2 While many underground banking
systems developed within ethnic societies because of a natural distrust of
the host country's institutions, many have a history that is rather more
complex and reflect indigenous social and cultural factors. The
importance of underground banking systems on money laundering
operations has become more widely appreciated in recent years and,
given the dispersal of certain ethnic communities, there is today little
doubt that such systems exist on an international basis.23 Given the
possible involvement of certain ethnic groups in highly profitable crimes,
such as drug trafficking, the significance of these traditional banking
systems and more recent adaptions and imitations, cannot be
underestimated.' Furthermore, given the distorting effect that the
underground banking system can have on money flows, it cannot be
ignored by those who operate wholly within the conventional banking
system.
Most underground systems will also, at some stage, have to
interface with conventional financial or banking institutions. There are
innumerable types of underground banking ranging from highly
sophisticated structures operated by overseas Chinese groups to relatively
informal barter and smuggling based operations in Africa. Most systems
do not involve the movement of cash and instead, depend on tokens for
their efficacy. The Chinese "Chit" or "Chop" system and the Indian
Hawalah operate primarily within defined racial groups often with some
additional bond of a tribunal or geographic nature. They rarely involve
the physical movement of cash, or for that matter anything other than
tokens that are regarded as the equivalent in value to the relevant cash
sums. The Hawalah system is rather more a system of compensation
through related transactions, but given the facility for aggregation, actual
payments between those "funding" the systems are kept to the minimum.
The efficiency of a paperless and practically recordless banking
system that is capable of transferring substantial amounts of wealth is
obviously an attraction for those involved in money laundering. Money
22. B.V. KUMAR, FLIGHT CAPITAL OPERATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
UNDERGROUND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND DRUGS AND DIRTY MONEY (1992); M. Duckworth,
Money Laundering Looms Large in Asia, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1991. W. Cassidy Fei-
Ch'lien, Flying Money: A Study of Chinese Underground Banking, Address at the Twelfth Annual
International Asian Organised Crime Conference (1990) (transcript available from U.S. Customs).
23. C. Blackhurst, Underworld Hijacks Underhand Banking, Bus., June 1998, at 86.
24. The General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol convened a special meeting to discuss the
underground banking in August 1991.
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launderers have emulated the underground systems to some extent, and
have shown an increasing willingness to make use of existing systems on
a commercial basis. Accordingly, laws and enforcement policies that
have been fashioned to address money laundering through conventional
banking systems are of little practical relevance in the case of such
underground systems.
If the picture that many have of money laundering is a little
misconceived, it is probable that the general conception of the type of
individual engaged in money laundering is also misperceived. Since the
days of Meyer Lansky, there have been individuals who are prepared,
for a fee or part of the action, to provide their services to whoever may
wish to have their money hidden or laundered.' Recent investigations
have identified individuals who have been prepared to service, through
the same offshore bank in the Caribbean, the financial interests of
terrorists in Northern Ireland, bank robbers in England, drug dealers in
Miami, and fraudsters in Hong Kong.26 Many of these individuals are
experts in financial and corporate matters and have created a network of
corporate and other entities in jurisdictions not known for their
willingness or ability to promote financial integrity. In a number of
investigations, such individuals have shown not just a willingness to
become involved in laundering hot and dirty money, but also to facilitate
other dubious financial and commercial transactions. In particular, they
have been prepared to utilize their corporate entities and offshore
banking facilities to front or give credibility to those engaged in advance
fee frauds and the like. Thus, modern money launderers are unlikely to
be involved as a member of a criminal organization. Rather, they are
much more likely to be on the periphery of the financial services or
banking industry and are professional advisors, such as a lawyers or
accountants, who are prepared to make their services available to
whoever is willing to pay.
VI. The Criminal Law: Combatting Money Laundering
It is virtually impossible to have a clear understanding of the
purpose of a law or regulatory policy without some appreciation of the
25. Meyer Lansky, although by no means the first person to launder the ill-gotten gains of
others as a business, was perhaps the first or at least most notorious money launderer to do so on
a scale that could service the needs of organized crime. See D. EISENBERG, ET AL., MEYER LANSKY
(1979); R. LACEY, LITTLE MAN-MEYER LANSKY AND THE GANGSTER LIFE (1991).
26. It has only been recently that the financial aspect to terrorist organizations has attracted the
attention of ordinary law enforcement agencies. See generally J. ADAMS, THE FINANCING OF
TERROR (New English Library, 1986); P. CLARE, RACKETEERING IN NORTHERN-IRELAND (1989);
R. CLUTTERBUCK, TERRORISM, DRUGS & CRIME IN EUROPE AFTER 1992 (1990).
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environment within which it has been cultured and is expected to
operate.
This is particularly true of rules that operate within the financial
sector, given the fact that, to a significant extent, most financial
institutions reflect the societies and social value that they have been
created or permitted to come into existence to serve. In the area of
regulation, far too little attention is given to the institutional aspects of
compliance and enforcement. Therefore, in an area of concern such as
money laundering, it is vital to look at the nature of the practice and to
have at least some regard for reality than the somewhat simplistic notions
that have become vogue.
It has been said, that before Britain had laws providing for the
seizure and confiscature of the proceeds of certain crimes - such as
those relating to illicit trafficking in drugs - there was relatively little
incentive for those engaged in such activities to go to the trouble and
expense of laundering their money.' As mentioned above, the
processes involved in laundering are not always cheap or risk free.
Therefore, such individuals did not have to go to the trouble of
laundering proceeds, as they were practically safe from confiscature.
Now, with the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986,28 British courts
do have the power to confiscate the proceeds of so-called profitable
crimes. Thus, the scales of economic balance are tipped firmly in favor
of cautious criminals engaging in money laundering. Somewhat
paradoxically, Britain has given organized criminals the incentive to
launder their ill-gotten gains without addressing the problems that this
gave rise to.
Before the enactment of the British Drug Trafficking Offenses Act
of 1986, there was not a great deal of discussion in Britain concerning
money laundering. Any debate that existed often centered on the need
to reinforce provisions for confiscature and forfeiture of the proceeds of
crime." Of course, historically it has long been recognized in English
law that it is appropriate to deprive a convicted felon of the instruments
of crime. During the 1970s and early 1980s, it became increasingly
accepted that it was desirable to take the profit out of those crimes which
were motivated by financial gain and which required a substantial degree
of reinvestment in a continuing enterprise. Various international
27. I. CRAvPTON, THE LAUNDERING OF CRIMINAL ASSETS AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
(1984).
28. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986 (Eng.).
29. See generally THE PROFITS OF CRIME AND THEIR RECOVERY: THE REPORT OF A
COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY SIR DEREK HODGSON (1984).
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meetings accepted this approach as necessary in combatting organized
crime, which itself was increasingly recognized as a reality worthy of
serious attention. 3 In Britain, as in virtually every other country, the
debate was dominated, if not captured, by those concerned with the
control and suppression of illicit trafficking in drugs. Within the various
agencies of the United Nations, a similar debate was taking place, and
at both the domestic and international level, attention was focused
exclusively on confiscature of the proceeds of drug trafficking and the
related issue of money laundering. Of course, the need to apply such
principles to other areas of criminal activity were voiced, particularly by
British Commonwealth Governments, most of which did not give control
of narcotics the same degree of priority as certain rather more developed
and dominant states. This, obviously, is not the place to enter into a
discussion of the various international and regional initiatives, or for that
matter English law, other than in outline. 1
A. Drug Trafficking Act of 199432
In Britain, the laundering of the proceeds of drug-related crimes was
made an offense by the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986."3 The
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 also made
it an offense to launder the funds of terrorist organizations .' However,
now that the European Community's Directive on Money Laundering has
been adopted and brought into law by the Criminal Justice Act of 1993,
laundering of the proceeds of all serious offenses is now a specific
criminal offense under English law."5
The provisions relating to the laundering of the proceeds of drug
trafficking have been consolidated and re-enacted in the Drug Trafficking
Act of 1994. Section 50 of the 1994 Act provides that it is an offense
for anyone to assist a drug trafficker to launder money by assisting them
30. Commonwealth Law Ministers meeting in Barbados in 1980, in Columbo in 1983, and in
Harare in 1986, recognized that organized crime was a major menace and should be attacked
through, among other things, asset removal programs. Various General Assemblies of ICPO-
Interpol and U.N. Crime Prevention Congresses similarly recognized the importance of attacking
serious crime through its assets. See generally M. FOONER, INTERPOL (1991); Barry Rider,
Commercial Crime Co-operation with the Commonwealth, in PUBLISHED PAPERS OF THE SEVENTH
COMMONWEALTH LAW CONFERENCE IN HONG KONG (1983).
31. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1989 (Eng.). See generally R. BOSWORTH-DAVIEs & G. SALTMARSH, MONEY
LAUNDERING - A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION (1994).
32. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994 (Eng.).
33. Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986 (Eng.).
34.- Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989 (Eng.).
35. See Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166/77); Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (Eng.).
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to retain or to control the benefits of their criminal activity, even if this
merely amounts to providing advice.36  It is necessary for the
prosecution to prove that the accused either knew or suspected that the
other person is or was engaged in drug trafficking or has benefited from
the drug trafficking activities of another person.37 The accused is
entitled to a defense if he can prove that he did not know or suspect that
this was the case, or that he would have informed the authorities, but for
a factor which reasonably prevented him from so doing.38 If a person
does make disclosure of his suspicions to the proper authorities, which,
in the case of employees of banks and financial intermediaries, is the
relevant compliance officer, he does not commit an offense even if he
subsequently, at the request of the authorities, provides assistance which
would otherwise be within the scope of the offense.39 Section 52, in an
attempt to further encourage reporting of suspicious transactions,
provides that it is an offense to fail to disclose knowledge or suspicion
of money laundering activity to the authorities, provided this is acquired
in the course of certain professional duties or certain types of
employment.' It is a defense, however, to prove that the person
concerned had a reasonable excuse for not passing on the information in
question or that it was passed to a designated compliance officer within
the relevant business or organization. 4' In regard to disclosure under
both sections 50 and 52, there is immunity from the consequences of
what might amount to a breach of contract or confidence.42 However,
this does not extend to, for example, liability for defamation, although
there is likely to be a defense of qualified privilege.
Section 53 of the 1994 Act renders it an offense to "tip-off" another
person that an investigation into money laundering is in progress or is
about to be commenced, when it is likely to be prejudicial to the
investigation.43 This is a widely drawn provision, as the accused is
entitled to a defense if he can prove that he did not know or suspect that




40. Id. s. 52. For a comprehensive discussion of "whistle blowing," see J. FROOMKIN, THE
RELUCTANT POLICEMEN (1991). See also ThE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL MARKETS
(1991); A. Samuels, Dirty Drugs Money, Bus. L. REv. (1986); Barry Rider, Memorandum
Submitted to the Select Committee on Trade and Industry: The Third Report: Company
Investigations, 1990 H.C. 36.
41. See Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 52 (Eng.).
42. Id. ss. 50, 52.
43. Id. s. 53.
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the disclosure was likely to prejudice a money laundering
investigation." Legal advisors are given specific protection from this
offense, but on the condition that the information in question is not
communicated in the furtherance of a criminal offense.45 In regard to
the proceeds of drug trafficking it should be noted that the offenses relate
to the proceeds of such activity, wherever it takes place.46 It is not
necessary that the proceeds in question have to be a result of activity
which is an offense under United Kingdom law, although it must be such
as would have been an offense had it occurred within the jurisdiction
where the drug trafficking took place.47
The provisions in the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 that
relate to money laundering were extended by the Criminal Justice
(International Cooperation) Act of 1990.48 These additional and
important provisions have also been codified in the Drug Trafficking Act
of 1994. Section 49(1) of the 1994 Act provides that it is an offense for
a person to conceal or to disguise any property that wholly or partly,
directly or indirectly, represents his own proceeds of drug trafficking.49
It is also an offense if the trafficker converts, transfers, or removes the
property from the jurisdiction of the courts.' This provision is aimed
at the drug trafficker in his attempt to launder the proceeds of his crime,
whereas section 49(2) renders it a crime for another person to engage in
such acts for the purpose of assisting any person to avoid prosecution for
a drug trafficking offense or the making of a confiscation order, when
he knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that the property. in
question is derived from the proceeds of drug trafficking. 5 Obviously
there is some overlap with section 50, which as stated earlier, renders it
an offense to assist another to retain the benefits of his illicit
trafficking.52
Section 51 is a particularly significant provision, as it renders it an
offense to acquire, possess or use property, knowing that it directly or
indirectly represents another person's proceeds of drug trafficking.53
It is important to note that before the offense can be committed, the
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s.53 (Eng.).
47. See id.
48. Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act, 1990 (Eng.).
49. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 49(1) (Eng.).
50. See id.
51. Id. s. 49(2).
52. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
53. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 51 (Eng.).
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person concerned must actually know that the property in question is
derived from drug trafficking.'M Mere suspicion is not sufficient.55
This section will not apply to property transferred' under a legitimate
contract, yet where the consideration is unreal, wholly inadequate, or
illegal, there may well be an offense under this provision, provided there
is the requisite degree of knowledge. 6 Statutory protection is afforded
to those who legitimately provide goods and services, as long as these
providers do not assist in the drug trafficking activities of the
recipient. 7 Such statutory protection is provided even if the provider
of the services is aware that payment is from the proceeds of a drug-
related offense.58 Thus, a lawyer receiving payment for defending a
drug trafficker would not commit an offense under this provision. It is
also a defense to a charge under this section that proper disclosure has
been made to the authorities, or, where appropriate, to a compliance
officer, or that the person concerned would have made due disclosure but
was delayed in doing so for a reasonable cause.59
B. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 19896'
The provisions relating to the laundering of terrorist funds remain
in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 and
are in some respects more draconian than those relating to the laundering
of the proceeds of drug trafficking. Under section 9 of the 1989 Act, it
is an offense for a person to engage in certain conduct with the intention
that or having reasonable cause to suspect that the funds in question will
be used to commit or further acts of terrorism in Britain or elsewhere.6'
The conduct in question includes soliciting or inviting another person to
(1) give, lend, or otherwise make available any money or other property;
(2) receive or accept from any other person any money or property; or
(3) use or have possession of any money or other property whether for
consideration or not.62 It is also an offense if a person, knowing or
having reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property will
be used to commit or further acts of-terrorism, either (1) gives, lends,





58. See Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 51 (Eng.).
59. See id.
60. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989 (Eng.).
61. Id. s. 9.
62. See id.
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concerned in an arrangement whereby money or other property is to be
made available to another person either immediately or at some time in
the future.' Section 10 provides that it is an offense for a person to
(1) solicit or invite any person to give, lend or otherwise make available
any money or other property, whether for consideration or not; (2) lend
or otherwise make available such property; (3) receive, accept, use or
have possession of any money or property; or (4) is concerned in an
arrangement whereby money or other property is to be made available
for the benefit of a proscribed terrorist organization.' Except where
the offense involves solicitation, it is a defense for the accused to
establish that he did not know or did not have reasonable cause to
suspect that the money or property in question was for the benefit of a
proscribed organization or related to such.6'
Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act is similar to section
50 of the Drug Trafficking Act of 1994 insofar as it renders it an offense
for a person to enter into or otherwise be concerned in an arrangement
that facilitates the retention or control of terrorist funds by or on behalf
of another person.' However, there is an important difference in terms
of the statutory defense to such a charge. In the case of section 11, the
accused must establish that he did not know or did not have reasonable
cause to suspect that the relevant arrangement related to terrorist funds,
the test being objective rather than subjective. As in the case of the
other provisions, section 11 applies to acts done or intended outside the
United Kingdom, provided they constitute offenses triable in the United
Kingdom. 7
Section 12 provides immunity to those who might otherwise be in
breach of contract or the law of confidence in reporting their suspicions
to the authorities.' Section 12 also provides a defense for those who
engage in activity that would otherwise constitute a crime, provided they
have made proper disclosure to the authorities and have been permitted
to proceed, or can establish that they informed the authorities as soon as
is reasonable after engaging in the relevant activity.69 It is also a
defense, as in the case of the drug trafficking provisions, that the accused
had a reasonable excuse for not informing the authorities or that the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, s. 9 (Eng.).
66. Seeid. s. 11. See also supra notes 36-39.
67. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, s. 11 (Eng.).
68. Id. s. 12.
69. Id.
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accused informed an appropriate person according to the terms of a
compliance procedure within the relevant organization.7'
The Criminal Justice Act of 1993 added to the 1989 Act a further
provision to bring the law relating to terrorist funds in line with that
relating to the laundering of drug-related funds. Section 18A makes it
an offense to fail to disclose knowledge or suspicion that financial
assistance is being given to promote terrorism.7' The obligation to
report knowledge or suspicion is imposed on those who in the course of
their trade, profession, business, or employment learn of the relevant
facts.72 They will be guilty of an offense if they do not "blow the
whistle" to the authorities, unless they prove that they have a reasonable
excuse for non-disclosure or that they notified a compliance officer as
prescribed by the relevant organization's procedure.73 As in the case
of the other provisions relating to the reporting of suspicions, a defense
is also provided in regard to allegations of breach of contract and
confidentiality .7"
Section 17 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act 1989, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, broadens the
offense of "tipping off" along the same lines as section 58 of the Drug
Trafficking Act of 1994. 75 It is now an offense for anyone to disclose
information relating to an investigation, actual or contemplated, with the
intention of prejudicing the inquiry.76
Similarly, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991
also contains provisions relevant to the funds of terrorist
organizations.77 Section 53 of that Act renders it an offense to assist
another person to retain the proceeds of terrorist-related activities, when
one knows or suspects that the person is or has been engaged in terrorist
activities or has benefited by virtue of such conduct.78 It is a defense
for the accused to prove that what is done has been done with the prior
consent of the authorities after proper disclosure to them or that there has
been disclosure as soon as is reasonable after the assistance in question
70. Id.




75. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, s. 17 (Eng.); see also Drug
Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 58 (Eng.).
76. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, s. 17.
77. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991 (Eng.).
78. Id. s. 53.
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has occurred.79 Furthermore, it is also a defense for the accused to
establish that he is not guilty because he did not know or did not suspect
that the arrangements related to the proceeds of terrorist-related activity
or that he intended to inform the authorities and had a reasonable excuse
for delaying."0 As in the case of the provisions relating to drug
trafficking, there is immunity from the civil law for proper disclosures
where the liability would be based on breach of contract or an obligation
of confidentiality. 8'
Additionally, it is an offense under section 54 of the Northern
Ireland Act to conceal, disguise, convert, or transfer property that in
whole or part, directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of terrorist-
related activity, or to remove it from the jurisdiction of the courts.'
Section 54(1) is directed at the terrorist racketeer who seeks to avoid
confiscature of the proceeds of his crimes, whereas section 54(2) is
aimed at those who assist such persons who know or have reasonable
cause to suspect the source of the proceeds of terrorist-related activity,
yet nevertheless assist the racketeers in "laundering" the proceeds of the
terrorist-related activity.83 It is also an offense for a person to acquire,
use, or possess property that they know or have reasonable cause to
suspect represents, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, another
person's proceeds of terrorist-related activity.' However, since the
Criminal Justice Act of 1993, it is a defense to such a charge if proper
consideration - other than services - was given or that the person
concerned intended to report his suspicions, but had reasonable excuse
for delaying." It is also a defense that what has been done was done
after proper disclosure to the authorities with their consent.86 There are
also the usual provisions protecting against liability for breach of contract
and the law of confidence.
Section 54A of the Northern Ireland Act, which was added by the
Criminal Justice Act 1993, 7 makes it an offense to fail to disclose
knowledge or suspicion of an offense under both sections 53 and 54 of




82. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, s. 54 (Eng.).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (Eng.).
86. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, s. 54 (Eng.).
87. See infra part VI.C.
88. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, s. 54A (Eng.).
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drug trafficking,89 this obligation to "blow the whistle" applies where
the facts were learned in the course of a trade, business, profession,
business or employment. The usual protections are provided in regard
to civil liability or where the disclosure was to an appropriate person
pursuant to a compliance procedure. Furthermore, legal advisors are
given protection provided they are acting within the confines of accepted
legal privilege.
C. Criminal Justice Act of 199390
It has already been stated previously that prior to the Criminal
Justice Act of 1993, attempts to launder the proceeds of crimes other
than those relating to drug trafficking and terrorism did not amount to a
specific criminal offense.91 Where a freezing or confiscation order had
been made under the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, an attempt to evade
it might constitute contempt of court.' There are also a variety of
disparate provisions such as those in the Companies Act of 1985 that
relate to the freezing of rights attaching to shares in certain
circumstances, which, in particular circumstances, might have relevance
in preventing activity that resembles laundering.' Furthermore, the
handling of the proceeds of a theft or deception is a specific offense
under section 22 of the Theft Act of 1968.1 The Criminal Justice Act
of 1993 extends most of the provisions that relate to money laundering
and are susceptible to the making of a confiscature order under the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988 to property derived from such criminal
activity. Thus, the proceeds from all offenses that are triable on
indictment and certain summary offenses, which have the smell of
organized crime about them, such as those relating to sex establishment,
supplying video recordings of unclassified work, possessing unclassified
videos for the purposes of supply, or the use of unlicensed premises for
the exhibition of videos, are within the reach of the new anti-money
laundering provisions.
Section 93A, which has been added to the Criminal Justice Act of
1988, makes it an offense for a person knowing or suspecting that
another is, has been engaged in, or has benefited from criminal conduct,
to enter into an arrangement, or otherwise be concerned in facilitating the
89. See supra notes 40-42.
90. Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (Eng.).
91. See supra notes 33-3s.
92. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988 (Eng.).
93. See Companies Act, 1985 (Eng.).
94. See Theft Act, 1968, s. 22 (Eng.).
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retention or control by or on behalf of another's proceeds of criminal
conduct, whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction of the
courts, or transfer to nominees or otherwise.95 It is also an offense to
enter into an arrangement or to be otherwise concerned Where the
proceeds of a person's criminal conduct are used to secure that funds are
placed at his disposal or are used to acquire property by way of
investment for that person's benefit.' As in the case of the drug-
related offenses, an accused is entitled to a defense if he proves that what
he did was done after proper disclosure to the authorities and with their
approval, or that he reported what had happened as soon as
reasonable.' Protection is also provided for those who disclose in
breach of contract or an obligation of confidentiality." An accused will
also be entitled to a defense if he can prove that he neither knew nor
suspected that any arrangement related to the proceeds of criminal
conduct or that the arrangement involved facilitating the laundering of
such proceeds. 9
Section 98B mirrors section 51 of the Drug Trafficking Act of 1994
in that it makes it an offense to acquire, use, or possess property,
knowing that it is, in whole or part, directly or indirectly, derived from
the proceeds of criminal conduct."m As in the case of section 51, it is
necessary that the prosecution establishes actual knowledge, mere
suspicion not being sufficient for liability.01 The same defenses are
also available, namely the payment of adequate consideration, provision
of goods and services in the ordinary course of business and "whistle
blowing."" By section 93C(l), it is an offense to conceal, disguise,
convert, transfer, or remove from the jurisdiction of the courts any
property which is directly or indirectly, in whole or part, the proceeds
of criminal conduct. 1" Section 93C(2) renders it a crime for anyone
else to assist another to do this, provided they have knowledge or
reasonable grounds to suspect that any of the property represents directly
or indirectly the proceeds of criminal conduct."'° Finally, section 93D
makes it an offense for a person knowing or suspecting that a money





100. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988 (Eng.). See also Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, s. 51 (Eng.).
101. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988 (Eng.).
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The objective element should be noted.
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laundering investigation is in progress or is about to be initiated, to
disclose this knowledge or suspicion to another if such disclosure is
likely to prejudice the inquiry."15
In addition to the substantive offenses, regard must be had to the
Money Laundering Regulations, which came into effect on April 1,
1994.'0 6  These regulations are concerned with implementing
mechanisms that ensure due compliance with the money laundering
legislation, deter money laundering, and facilitate effective and efficient
detection and investigation. As such, financial institutions that are within
the scope of the Regulations are required to create, implement, and
operate internal procedures." Failure to do this is a criminal offense,
although it is a defense for the institution to show that it took all
reasonable steps and exercised proper due diligence in seeking to comply
with the requirements of the Regulations."
There was considerable debate prior to the enactment of the Drug
Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 as to whether it would be appropriate
to follow the practice in the United States and require by law the
reporting to an official agency, all cash and certain other financial
transactions in excess of a specific amount to official agencies. This was
opposed by the British banking community on the basis that it would be
unworkable. The Government accepted this, and the legislation
introduced a suspicion-based reporting system which, as discussed above,
has been strengthened by the Criminal Justice Act of 1993. Where an
individual is aware or suspects that he is dealing with a person who has
funds by virtue of a drug offense, then he will be entitled to a defense on
a charge of laundering, provided he reports his suspicions to the
authorities. The authorities are empowered to authorize that person to
continue to provide the service in question to enable further information
to be obtained. The person who does report his suspicions is relieved
from the prospect of civil liability for breach of contract, but possibly not
other forms of civil liability.
VII. Civil Liability: Making the Launderer Pay
While the various provisions that exist in the criminal law have
produced problems for those who regularly handle other people's money,
in practice there is little chance of someone ending up in the criminal
courts who has not acted with knowledge that he is participating in the
105. Id.
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laundering of dirty money. It is most unlikely that an honest, but stupid
banker would find himself in court. Thus, criminal law, while obviously
important, is nonetheless primarily a sword to be brandished in terrorem.
Of course, the criminal law does set standards upon which regulations
and compliance procedures can operate with due authority, and perhaps
most important, it provides a basis for international cooperation.
Perhaps of far greater significance in terms of risk for the ordinary
banker and financial intermediaries is the civil law. It is possible to
conceive of a number of scenarios where civil liability for conspiracy or
fraud might be a risk in a money laundering operation. It is the
developments that have taken place in the law relating to constructive
trusts that have placed such persons in real jeopardy. The majority of
cases before the British Chancery Courts today involve attempts by
persons who have been defrauded by another to impose liability on
others, such as bankers or financial intermediaries, who in some way or
another facilitated the fraud. There are clear advantages in pursuing the
facilitators of transactions, as they are often relatively well-funded, more
susceptible in practical terms to the jurisdiction of the court, and often
are regulated or at least subject to some kind of professional supervision
to keep and maintain records. In other words, they are easy and
relatively wealthy targets who are almost certainly not going to adopt the
tactics of a "real" fraudster. Indeed, U.S. agencies have long realized
the cost effectiveness of "hitting" the professional financial advisor and
thereby require such persons to almost vouch for the integrity of their
clients and the deals they "sponsor."
The recent flood of cases seeking to impose civil liability on those,
which might broadly be described as "fiduciary facilitators," are based
on a principle of law most clearly set out by Ungoed-Thomas J in
Selangor United Rubber Estates v. Cradock.'" In this case, the
learned judge referred to an established principle of equity, where a
person who knowingly participates in another's breach of trust will be
regarded as standing in the same place as the trustee. While there has
been much discussion in the books and cases as to the exact nature of
this liability, particularly whether in all cases it is properly considered a
constructive trust relationship, suffice it to say that there would appear
to be only two problems in fashioning this rule to become a most
effective weapon against the money launderer. The first is simply what
sort of misconduct will be sufficient to bring the principle into play.
Most of the cases have involved either a conventional trust relationship,
109. 1 W.L.R 1555 (1968) (Eng.).
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or at least something so close as to make little practical difference. It
would seem, however, that the property diverted or misappropriated by
the trustee must be capable of sustaining a proprietary claim and, is
therefore, capable of being trust property.
This point arose in the interesting case of Nanus Asia Co. Inc. v.
Standard Chartered Bank."' Although the circumstances of the case
are somewhat complex, it is sufficient to point out here, that the Hong
Kong Court was required to determine whether the Standard Chartered
Bank was in a position analogous to that of a constructive trustee in
regard to profits from insider dealing in the United States made by a
Taiwanese. There was no problem in this case in regard to the bank's
state of knowledge, as it had already been joined in civil enforcement
proceedings in the United States,
There has been considerable discussion as to the requisite state of
knowledge. The cases have indicated two basic standards, one requiring
subjective knowledge, and the other a more objective or constructive
standard. The distinction could be justified in terms of whether the third
party who facilitates the breach of trust comes into possession of the
relevant property or simply facilitates its control or retention by another.
In the first case, a more objective standard was considered appropriate
and knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable man on notice that
something dishonest was afoot would be sufficient to justify trustee
liability. On the other hand, where the participation of the third party
does not extend possession of the property, it was thought that the
requisite degree of scienter should be actual knowledge.
In view of recent cases, it would seem that the fact situations are
usually complex and the question of knowledge is rather more bound up
With the nature of liability that is being imposed."' If the third party
does not come into possession of the trust property or its proceeds, then
it is difficult to conceive of him as a constructive trustee, or for that
matter as having any status that would involve a proprietary nexus. The
liability of such a person for participating in the breach of trust will be
personal. For example, in AGIP (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson,12 the Court
of Appeal found no difficulty in holding that individuals who had
facilitated the laundering of proceeds of a fraud, by incorporating
companies and opening bank accounts in the names of these companies,
were constructive trustees and thus, personally liable. Of course, in such
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cases, the liability is personal to the defendant and does not involve a
proprietary liability. In this case, however, the courts found that the
persons concerned had acted dishonestly. They knew or should in the
circumstances have known and deliberately refrained from inquiries that
would have easily uncovered the fraud.
Although the cases do indicate varying qualities of knowledge, it
would seem the better view today that before a third party can be held
liable as a facilitator, the court will have to be shown that the third party
knew the facts or deliberately turned a blind eye and acted with a lack
of probity. "3  Thus, the prospect that a banker or financial
intermediary could be held personally liable for negligently participating
in money laundering operations appears to be receding. However, the
position is still not certain and the courts are plainly unsympathetic to
those who become involved in such operations." 4 Speaking of the
defendants in AGIP v. Jackson, Mr. Justice Millet, as he then was,
observed:
[T]hey made no enquiries ... because they thought that it was none
of their business. That is not honest behaviour. The sooner that
those who provide the services of nominee companies for the purpose
of enabling their clients to keep their activities secret realise it the
better. I15
The interrelationship between the obligations of due diligence cast
upon those who handle other people's money and the willingness of the
courts to impose liability for knowing participation in breaches of trust
has yet to be addressed." 6  Obviously, the more information that
intermediaries are required to obtain and test, the more onerous will be
their responsibilities, not only in regard to compliance with the civil law,
but also in regard to their duties under the criminal law. The more that
an intermediary is bound to know about its client, the greater will be the
obligation. For example, in the context of financial services law,
intermediaries will have to ensure that financial advice is not only
carefully given and researched, but is suitable to the circumstances of
that particular client. By the same token, the more information that is
required according to due diligence and compliance procedures, the more
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difficult it will be for an intermediary to resist allegations that it did
know, or at best turned a blind eye, to its involvement in a breach of
trust. Intermediaries and professional advisers are placed on the horns
of dilemma. They are being pressured from a variety of irresistible
sources to create more information, which will fix them with greater
knowledge on the one side, and yet on the other they are being required
to assume responsibility for the integrity of transactions on the basis they
had knowledge 'or should have had knowledge of the relevant facts. It
might not even be sufficient for an intermediary to deliberately curtail its
access to information, as within both the risk of liability in the criminal
and civil law and certainly at the level of administrative and disciplinary
proceedings, the requisite standards as to what information should be
obtained and digested are set objectively.
In a number of countries, particularly those that have derived their
laws from the Civil and Roman law traditions, the concept of the trust
is either unknown or relatively undeveloped. However, even in some of
these jurisdictions, such as Japan and Taiwan, law creating trust
relationships is in the course of being introduced. Furthermore, the trust
is a very well-known concept throughout the common law world, and
even in Islamic law it is possible to find parallels. As the Hong Kong
case of Nanus Asia Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank"7 clearly shows,
it is possible to utilize these concepts by suing overseas, even in cases
where a trust may not arise in a particular state. In Standard Chartered
Bank, one of the defendants was a Taiwanese and the "hot money" was
on its way to Taipei when the Hong Kong Court "froze it." In another
recent case, Indonesia, a country where the trust is a very foreign
concept, utilized, among other legal devices, a constructive trust to
"freeze" and recover the proceeds of corruption that were held in
Singapore.
VIII. Conclusion
This article has attempted to analyze what is meant by the
laundering of money and wealth. It has deliberately avoided
concentrating on the control of drug money, as this is a topic which has
received a great deal of attention over the years. Rather, this article has
attempted to demonstrate that by removing the financial benefit of crime,
the motive for committing such crimes is undermined, as is the ability of
criminals, particularly when syndicated and organized, to reinvest or
fund other criminal and subversive activities. At present, sadly, crime
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does pay - in every country. Perhaps not minor street crimes, but
crimes such as banking and stock market frauds, racketeering and even
illicit trafficking in drugs and other controlled and banned commodities.
Organized crime groups and terrorists have recognized this and have
moved into such areas of activity. Seeking to remove the profits and
assets from such sophisticated and internationally mobile criminals
merely gives them an incentive to engage in money laundering, and
thereby, not only hamper the effective removal of these funds, but place
out of reach vital intelligence. Therefore, asset removal programs must
be based on the existence of laws rendering the laundering of money and
derivative wealth a specific criminal offense, and law enforcement must
have the resources, training, will, and political support to ensure that
such laws are properly applied.
Too much attention has been focused on the formal procedures for
mutual assistance in matters, resulting in a loss of emphasis on such
matters as the development of intelligence and the pursuit of criminal and
abusive activity through alternative means. Britain has become
increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of the criminal law in
dealing with serious frauds. In 1987, it established a special agency, the
Serious Fraud Office, with very wide investigatory powers, to pursue
economic criminals and bring them before the criminal justice system.
In certain respects this did not work, even though vast resources were
spent. Consequently, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office is
currently calling for fraudsters to be pursued through non-criminal
procedures such as administrative and civil proceedings.
Now that the value of enforcement through civil proceedings is
finally being acknowledged domestically, should we not learn from this
experience at the international level? To misquote the famous phrase:
There is more in Heaven and Earth, than in criminal law. If we are
serious about protecting our societies and economies, all the devices and
weapons of the legal system must be used to prevent, discourage, detect,
interdict, and control those who wish to destroy what we value.

